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This paper analyzes the political economy of income redistribution
when voters are concerned about tax compliance. We consider a two stage-
model where there is a two party competition over the tax rate in the first
stage and voters decide about their level of tax compliance in the second
stage. We model political competition à la Wittman with the ideology of
parties endogenously determined at equilibrium. We calibrate the model
for an average of EU-27 countries. Numerical simulations provide the
tax rates proposed by the two parties and the level of tax compliance.
We find that a decrease in confidence in tax morale, and an increase in
parties’ uncertainty about the preferences of the median voter increase
the probability that the party offering the lowest income tax will win and
decrease tax compliance.
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In the context of the recent debt crisis, tax compliance has been a hot issue
in many parliaments of developed countries. For instance, Mitt Romney’s case
of tax avoidance introduced another dimension into the debate about income
taxes in the 2012 US Elections. The importance of tax compliance in politics
is even greater in European countries with financing problems such as Greece,
Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy. While millions of citizens are asked by their
governments to bear heavy tax hikes, recent news report important cases of tax
evasion, tax avoidance and tax fraud by politicians and large fortunes in these
countries (see the case of the Barcenas scandal1 , Lagarde’s list or the Spanish
tax amnesty for some examples). This misbehavior affects public opinion on
society’s tax morale which may result in voters’ shifting their preferences for
income redistribution.
The aim of this paper is to study political behavior when the salient electoral
issue is income tax, voters have concerns about tax compliance, and political
parties are formed endogenously. We propose a two-stage model in which parties
compete over the level of income redistribution (through a flat income tax and
social transfer) in the first stage, and voters decide about their level of tax
compliance in the second stage. We find that as voters become more confident
about society’s tax morale, there is an increase in both the probability that
the party more in favor of income redistribution will win and the level of tax
compliance.
There is a vast literature on tax compliance (see Andreoni,1998; Slemrod
and Yitzhaki, 2002; Slemrod, 2007 for excellent surveys). Most of the stud-
ies in the literature are based on the framework proposed by Allingham and
Sandmo (1972) in which tax payers maximize their expected utility under the
probability of a penalty if they are caught underreporting their taxable income.
This deterrence theory has been criticized by many authors because it predicts
a much lower compliance rate than what we actually observe (see Graetz and
Wilde, 1985; Alm et al., 1992; Frey and Feld, 2002).
Behavioral models that assume some tax morale in tax payers try to solve
this empirical problem. For instance, Erard and Feinstein (1994) proposed a
model in which tax noncompliance produces feelings of guilt and shame that
are incorporated exogenously in taxpayers’ utility function. Gordon (1989)
addressed the topic of fairness and tax compliance. He makes the psychic cost
of tax evasion endogenous in a dynamic model in which this psychic cost varies
inversely with the number of individuals evading in the previous period. Other
papers have focused on the effect of corruption and waste of resources by the
government on tax compliance. Pommerehne, Albert Hart, and Frey (1994)
presented a dynamic model in which taxpayer compliance reduces with deviation
between the individual’s optimal choice of public good provision and the one
1A description of the facts can be found here: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/01/world/europe/prime-
minister-of-spain-accused-of-receiving-payouts.html?_r=0
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implemented, noncompliance by other taxpayers, and the level of government
waste in the previous period.
Following the approach of these behavioral models, we assume that indi-
viduals are ethical regarding tax avoidance. That is, they have direct negative
preferences on the aggregated level of tax avoidance in society. Consequently,
any increase in the aggregated level of tax avoidance directly reduces tax payers’
welfare. Additionally, we assume that there is no mechanism of punishment to
induce compliance. Therefore, tax morale is the only reason to comply. This is
done for the sake of simplicity as incorporating punishment would complicate
the analysis and not add any further insight to our study.
Empirically, Spicer and Becker (1980) supported the premise that fairness
is important for tax compliance. They experimentally find that individuals’
decisions about tax evasion depend on the relative comparison between their
payments and others’ payments. Theoretically, a similar approach is suggested
in Bordignon(1993) who modeled taxpayers with Kantian preferences. That is,
individuals’ decisions about compliance depend on what they consider is fair,
which in turn would depend on their conjectures about the aggregated level of
tax compliance.
We incorporate this feature in our model assuming that voters behave ac-
cording to Kant’s morals, that is, any individual assumes that the other indi-
viduals will act as she does. More precisely, we assume that taxpayers make
conjectures about the aggregated level of tax compliance, i.e. about society’s tax
morale, and these conjectures depend on their particular willingness to comply.
We assume that these conjectures may be biased. In particular, we consider the
possibility that taxpayers believe that their degree of tax compliance is larger
than the mean of the society. In that case, we say that individuals make pes-
simistic conjectures about society’s tax morale. We are interested in analyzing
the effect of these conjectures on political outcomes.
Kantian ethics were originally applied to macroeconomics by Laffont (1975).
He used this assumption to justify some ethical behaviors in numerous popula-
tions subjected to macroeconomic constraints. Other more recent studies such
as Federsen (2004) introduced this framework in a model in which voters are
assumed to be ethical in a Kantian manner to explain the voting paradox. A
more axiomatic study is that of Roemer (2010), who defined a new game theory
equilibrium concept, which he called Kantian Equilibrium, and showed some of
its applications.
To the best of our knowledge, the article closest to our framework is Boadway
et al. (2007). They consider that taxpayers take into account whether their tax
liabilities correspond to what they view as ethically acceptable in order to choose
their labor supplies. If individuals find that the tax rate is ethical, then they
choose their labor supplies without taking into account the tax rate. However,
if it is not ethical for them, individuals behave egoistically, allowing taxes to
distort their labor supplies. Broadway et al. found that labor supply becomes
less elastic when individuals behave ethically. In comparison with their study, a
limitation of our model is that individuals’ pre-tax income is exogenously given
and taxes do not distort the labor market. We do this for the sake of simplicity,
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and because our focus is on the formation and behavior of political parties that
compete on income redistribution.
Regarding political competition, we consider that political parties are formed
endogenously and they care about policy. We use the concept of the Endoge-
nous Party Wittman Equilibrium (EPWE) proposed by Roemer (2001) in a
framework in which two ideological parties compete in an election by proposing
two income taxes. Parties face uncertainty about the probability of winning.
One party is more in favor of income redistribution (Left Party) than the other
(Right Party). Voters, who are taxpayers, vote sincerely for their preferred
policy and the party with the highest share of the vote wins the election and
implements the announced policy. The ideology of each party is endogenously
determined by aggregating the preferences of its voters.
Political competition models with an EPWE have been used to explain a
variety of policy outcomes such as the public good provision and its financing
(Ortuño-Ortín and Roemer, 2000); the public versus private provision of so-
cial insurance programs (De Donder and Hindriks, 2006), the structure of the
labor market (Lee and Roemer, 2005), and immigration policy (Llavador and
Solano, 2011). Our analysis is closer to Ortuño-Ortín and Roemer (2000) be-
cause in both papers the policy outcome is the income tax, but we incorporate
the possibility of tax avoidance.
The disadvantage of this methodology is that there is not usually a close form
solution for the equilibrium and it is needed to resort to numerical simulations.
We calibrate the model using data from the average of the EU-27 countries in
2010. We take data from Eurostat for income distribution and income tax rate,
and from the World Bank for the size of the shadow economy (which we use as
a proxy of the level of tax noncompliance).
Our main results are as follows. First, at equilibrium, the Left Party and
Right Party propose a tax rate, respectively, above and below the optimal one
for the median voter. Moreover, it predicts an expected tax rate and a rate of
compliance very close to the ones reported by the data.
Second, the Left Party always reacts more intensively than the Right Party
to changes in parameters of the model. This is because by incorporating the
possibility of noncompliance, the Right Party gains a large fixed constituency
who has strict preferences towards a minimum income taxation, while the Left
Party’s constituency has more variable preferences. Therefore, an increase in
either the electorate’s pessimistic bias about society’s tax morale or the elec-
torate’s sensitivity to the social cost of tax avoidance makes the Left Party move
their proposed tax rate more than the Right Party.
Pessimistic beliefs about society’s tax morale make the Left Party heavily
reduce their tax rate proposed in equilibrium, while it slightly increases the tax
rate proposed by the Right Party. As voters become less confident about the
aggregated level of tax compliance, they prefer a lower tax rate and a lower
degree of compliance. This gives an advantage to the Right Party to win the
elections and hence the probability that the Right Party will win increases in
equilibrium. As a result, the expected implemented tax rate falls and the rate
of evaders increases.
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An increase in voters’ sensitivity to the social cost of tax avoidance makes
both parties propose a lower tax rate in equilibrium. This is because it makes
every unit of tax burden evaded more costly in terms of utility, so it disincentives
income taxation. This also gives an advantage to the Right Party to win the
election. However, the effect of tax morale in tax compliance is less distorting
than the effect of biased beliefs about society’s tax morale because the former
is symmetric for all individuals and orthogonal to private consumption. Conse-
quently, an increase in voters’ sensitivity to tax evasion has almost no effect on
either the probability of winning or the share of tax evaders.
Finally, we analyze the effect of parties’ uncertainty in equilibrium outcomes.
As shown in Roemer (2001), an increase in parties’ accuracy to forecast their
vote share makes both parties converge to the optimal policy for the median
voter in equilibrium. However, the Left Party converges faster than the Right
Party. Again, the reason is the large share of an immobile Right Party’s con-
stituency with strict preferences. This gives an advantage to the Left Party to
win the election and increases the Left Party’s probability of winning. There-
fore, the expected implemented tax rate is larger and the share of tax evaders
decreases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we formally
describe the model, and analyze voters’ preferences for income redistribution
given the previous preferences for tax compliance. In section 3, we focus on
the political competition stage and define the equilibrium concept we use. In
section 4 we calibrate the model and calculate the interior equilibria doing some
comparative statics. Finally, in section 5 we conclude and discuss some results.
2 The Model
Society is composed of a continuum of voters of mass equal to one. Voters are
characterized by their pre-tax income yi ∈ (0, Y ] according to probability distri-
bution function F (yi) with mean y =
∫ Y
0 yidF (yi) and median ym = [F ]
−1 (1/2).
Voters have direct preferences over consumption (ci) and the social cost pro-
duced by the perceived level of tax avoidance (Ai). Tax avoidance has a direct
effect on the utility of voters that must be understood in a broad sense as a
public bad. We assume this social impact to be increasing, at a decreasing rate,
in the amount of tax avoidance. Formally, we take the utility of a native to be
Ui(ci, Li) = ci − βA
2
i
with β > 0. Voters may not report their whole pre-tax income before taxes
are levied. Let xi ∈ [0, 1] be the share of taxable income yi reported by a voter i,
so the the amount of tax avoidance by this voter can be measured by (1−xi)yi.
Voters face uncertainty about the degree of the aggregated level of tax com-
pliance. That is, they face uncertainty about the mean of the distribution of
the share of taxable income reported by voters once voters have decided their
degree of tax compliance, which is denoted by x. Let xei ∈ [0, 1] be voter i’s
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expected value of the aggregated level of tax compliance in society. We assume
that voters are ethical in a Kantian manner in the sense that they use their own
level of tax compliance xi as a reference to predict the aggregated level of tax
compliance. More precisely, we assume that all voters have the same structure
of conjectures about the aggregate level of tax compliance, which are as follows:
xei = θxi + ǫi
where θ ∈ (0, 1] stands for the possible pessimistic bias about the aggregated
degree of tax compliance, and ǫi ∈ [−1, 1] is a random error term with zero mean
and standard deviation σ. Notice that this structure of conjectures coincides
with rational expectations when θ = 1. However, our assumed structure of be-
liefs is more general because, on average, expectations about tax compliance
may have a pessimistic bias whenever θ is smaller than one. Notice also that
the beliefs about the aggregated level of tax compliance do not depend on indi-
viduals’ income, i.e. voters believe that the degree of tax avoidance and income
are independent variables.
The perceived aggregated level of tax avoidance for a voter i is defined as
the perceived sum of all taxable income that is not reported. Formally, it takes
the following expression:
Ai = t(1− x
e
i )y
Government is formed by the winner of an electoral process that we will
describe later on. The goal of government is to redistribute income. To do so
it has two policy instruments: an income tax, t, and a public transfer, b. Let
bi be voter i′s expected level of public transfer that depends on x
e
i . We assume
that all voters believe that the government budget constraint is balanced, that




Therefore, government actually has to define one policy instrument since
the other is given by their commitment to balance the budget. We choose the
tax rate as the strategic policy variable. Notice that given a tax rate imple-
mented by the government, the public transfer implemented, b, may not match
all voters’ expectations. This is because they fail to forecast the aggregated
level of tax compliance. We are aware that in a dynamic setting voters may
react to this mismatch between conjectures and real policy. However, as voters
and politicians seems to be short-run players, it is not hard to find examples in
which this mismatch has not had future electoral consequences.
We propose a game described by the following stages:
1. Political parties announce their political platforms formed by a tax rate.
2. Elections take place and voters vote for the political platform they most
prefer.
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3. The winner of the election implements their announced policy.
4. Voters decide their level of tax compliance given the implemented tax rate
and their beliefs about the aggregated level of tax compliance.
5. Taxes are levied, public transfers are paid and consumption is realized.
We solve the game backwards. That is, first we analyze voters preferences
for tax compliance, second we characterize voters preferences over the political
instrument, i.e. the level of income redistribution, and finally we analyze the
behavior of political parties.
2.1 Voters’ decisions about tax evasion
Given the tax rate imposed by the government, voters form their conjectures
about the total tax revenue, and they correspondingly decide their optimal level
of tax compliance.
We assume that voters spend all their post-tax income, so consumption can
be expressed as:
ci = (1− t)xiyi + (1− xi)yi + bi ⇔
ci = yi − txiyi + b











Ai = t(1− x
e
i )y
xei = θxi + ǫi
The first-order condition is as follows:
t(θy − yi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Redistribution Effect
+ 2β(ty)2(1− (θx∗i + ǫi))θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Responsibility Effect
= 0 (2)
The individual decision of tax avoidance has two potential effects on welfare.
First, there is an effect on private consumption that could be positive or neg-
ative depending if voters believe that they benefit from income redistribution
or not. We call this effect the redistribution effect. Second, there is a posi-
tive effect on voters’ welfare because, by increasing tax compliance, they reduce
their perceived social cost of tax avoidance. We call this effect the responsibility
effect.
Voters who perceive themselves as net benefitted from income redistribution
(so they have both positive redistribution and responsibility effects) prefer to
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report their whole taxable income. This is the case for voters with a low enough
income. More precisely, this is the case for voters with an income such that
yi ≤ θy. Otherwise, there is a trade-off between the responsibility effect and the
redistribution effect when the latter is negative, that is, when voters believe that
they are net contributors regarding income redistribution because their income
is larger than the perceived average taxable income, i.e. yi ≤ θy. Therefore, a
positive level of tax avoidance may be optimal for these voters.
In the following proposition we characterize voters’ optimal level of tax com-
pliance.






1 if yi ≤ θg(1− ǫi − θ)
θg(1−ǫi)−yi
θ(g(θ)−g(0)) if yi ∈ (θg(1− ǫi − θ), θg(1− ǫi))
0 if yi ≥ θg(1− ǫi)
, and (3)
where g(z) = (1 + 2βtyz)y.
Proof. See the appendix.
The structure of voters’ preferences about tax evasion crucially depends on
the perception voters have on whether they are net benefitted from income re-
distribution or not. In fact, only voters with an intermediate income relative to
their pessimistic bias about the aggregated level of tax compliance do not have
extreme preferences on tax compliance. These are voters who face a negative
redistribution effect, so they believe they are net contributors to income redis-
tribution, and this makes them prefer to reduce their reported taxable income.
However, they also care about tax avoidance, which makes them increase their
reported taxable income. This trade-off causes voters not to choose an extreme
level of tax compliance.
In the next proposition we state the relationship between voters’ pre-tax
income and their optimal level of tax compliance.
Proposition 2 Voters’ optimal level of tax compliance is weakly decreasing in
their pre-tax income for all voters.
Proof. See the appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 comes from the fact that tax evasion is
a way to avoid income redistribution. Therefore, as voters become richer they
face a larger cost of reporting taxable income. Moreover, voters’ social cost of
tax avoidance does not depend on individuals’ income but on the mean income.
Let us now analyze how individuals with the same income react to changes in
the conjectures about the aggregated level of tax compliance, that is, the effect
of a change in θ. Notice that a change in θ only affects voters who have a negative
distribution effect, that is, voters that perceive themselves as net contributors
to income redistribution. By (2) an increase in θ makes the redistribution effect
less negative by pushing those voters for a higher tax compliance. However,
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the sign of the effect on the responsibility effect is not clear. The following
proposition states that the result of the latter potential trade-off depends on
the size of θ.
Proposition 3 An increase in θ reduces the size of the group of voters who do
not report their whole taxable income. However, it also reduces the optimal level
of tax compliance for those voters who do not report their whole taxable income.
Proof. See the appendix.
The first statement of the proposition is explained by the effect of the pes-
simistic bias about the aggregated level of tax compliance upon the redistribution
effect. That is, as the pessimistic bias about the aggregated level of tax compli-
ance decreases, more taxpayers believe that they are net benefactors from the
social transfer. More taxpayers will then decide to report their whole taxable
income (and the poorest taxpayer who starts to evade taxes will now be reacher
than before).
However, for those taxpayers who are rich enough and perceive themselves
to be net contributors to the social transfer, a reduction in the pessimistic bias
reduces their optimal level of tax compliance. This is because now the respon-
sibility effect becomes smaller for all taxpayers given that a smaller proportion
of the population is avoiding taxes. The latter pushes down the desired level of
tax compliance for these tax evaders.
Finally, we do comparative statics regarding the government instrumental
policy, i.e., the tax rate. Again, only voters with intermediate income levels have
an optimal share of reported taxable income that depends on the tax rate. The
following proposition states the relation between the tax rate and the optimal
level of tax compliance for those voters.
Proposition 4 The optimal level of tax compliance is weakly increasing in the
tax rate for all voters.
Proof. See the appendix.
This result comes directly from the marginal utility of the aggregated level of
tax compliance in society. The higher the size of potential tax revenues the larger
the potential utility because of tax compliance. This concern drives voters to
prefer to report a larger proportion of their taxable income when the size of the
welfare state is larger. In this context, the tax rate can be seen as a government
policy to fight tax avoidance: the larger the tax rate, the higher the moral cost
of tax avoidance and hence the larger the degree of tax compliance. Therefore,
we can expect that parties that are more concerned about tax compliance will
offer a high tax rate. We are aware that this effect would be smaller in an
economy where taxes could distort economic behavior.
2.2 Voters’ preferences on income redistribution
Once we have analyzed voters’ decisions about tax compliance we can char-
acterize their preferences over the tax rate. In the previous section we prove
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that voters’ preferences over tax compliance depends on: first, voters’ conjec-
tures about the aggregated level of tax compliance and second, voters’ pre-tax
income.
Substituting the optimal share of reported taxable income , x∗i , for voters’
utility function, we obtain the general expression of voters’ indirect utility func-
tion, which is given by the following expression:
v(t) = yi + tx
∗
i (θy − yi) + tǫiy − βt
2(1− θx∗i − ǫi)
2y2 (4)
As stated in Proposition 1, voters prefer a different degree of tax compliance
depending on their pre-tax income. These income boundaries are also effective
for determining voters’ preferences for income redistribution. Substituting the
optimal level of tax compliance for voters, x∗, in the expression above, we obtain





yi + t((θ + ǫi)y − yi)− βt
2(1− θ − ǫi)
2y2 if yi ≤ θg(1− ǫi − θ)
yi −
1
2θ [(2θ + 1)yi − (2(θx
∗
i + ǫi) + 1)θy]t if yi ∈ (θg(1− ǫi − θ), θg(1− ǫi))
yi − β(1− ǫi)t
2y2 if yi ≥ θg(1− ǫi)
(5)
Using the expression above, we state the following proposition.
Proposition 5 The optimal tax rate is equal to zero for all voters such that
yi > θg(1− ǫi − θ).
Proof. See the appendix.
The optimal tax rate is zero for all voters with an income level such that
they perceive themselves as net contributors to income redistribution. Other-
wise, they may prefer a positive tax rate. We now explore preferences on income
redistribution for voters who optimally prefer some degree of income redistrib-
ution, i.e., voters with a level of income yi such that yi ≤ θg(1− θ− ǫi). In this
case, by maximizing the indirect utility function, (5) we obtain the following
voters’ optimal tax rate:2
t∗i =
(θ + ǫi)y − yi
2β(1− θ − ǫi)2y
2 (6)
Notice that this optimal tax rate can be also equal to zero or to one depending
on both idiosyncratic variables (such as yi and ǫi) and the pessimistic bias about





1 if yi ≤ (θ + ǫi − 2βy(1− θ − ǫi)2)y
(θ+ǫi)y−yi
2β(1−θ−ǫi)2y2
if yi ∈ (θ + ǫi − 2βy(1− θ − ǫi)
2)y, (θ + ǫi)y)
0 if yi ≥ (θ + ǫi)y
(7)
2The first-order condition of this maximization problem is as follows:
(θ + ǫi)y − yi − 2βt(1− θ − ǫi)
2y2 = 0
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From (5) and (7) we fully characterize voters’ preferences for income redis-
tribution in the next proposition.
Proposition 6 If θ is large enough, the optimal tax rate for a voter i is given









if yi ∈ (θ + ǫi − 2βy(1− θ − ǫi)2)y, yH)
0 yi ≥ yH
where yH = argmin{θg(1− ǫi − θ), (θ+ ǫi)y}. Otherwise, t
∗
i is only equal to
either 0 or 1.
Proof. See the appendix.
This proposition highlights the importance of bias in voters’ conjectures
about tax compliance on voters’ preferences for income redistribution. In fact,
when the pessimistic bias in voters’ beliefs about the average level of tax com-
pliance is low enough, there are voters with an intermediate optimal tax rate.
This is because a high tax rate favors poor voters, but increases the direct cost
of tax avoidance. If voters believe that this direct cost is too high, then there is
no room for a trade-off. Otherwise, if voters’ pessimism is moderated, then some
voters (the richest voters among those who report their entire taxable income)
will face a trade-off between expropriating the rich and not facing any direct
cost of tax avoidance.3
Summarizing, there are only three possible optimal tax rates for all voters: i)
The extreme case of zero tax rate, which is the most preferred policy for voters
with a high enough income; ii) the extreme case of full taxation, which is the
optimal policy for voters with a low enough income; and iii) an intermediate
tax rate, which is only optimal for voters with an intermediate income.
Regarding the relationship between voters’ optimal tax rate and voters’ con-
jectures about society’s tax morale we state the following proposition.
Proposition 7 The optimal tax rate is weakly increasing in θ for all voters.
Proof. See the appendix.
Notice by (4) that an increase in the confidence in society’s tax morale
positively affected the indirect utility function because it increases the redis-
tributive effect of public transfers and also reduces the negative effect of tax
evasion. Therefore, as society’s confidence in tax morale increases, voters who
report their whole income for any tax rate will prefer a larger tax rate .
In the next section, we analyze the political competition stage that deter-
mines the implemented tax rate. We describe the political process as a com-
petition between policy-oriented parties (that is, parties that care about the
3Notice also that Proposition 6 could be stated in terms of the idiosyncratic error in voters’
beliefs, ǫi, instead of in terms of voters’ bias in beliefs about tax morale. That is, it would
have been equivalent to stating "for ǫi small enough," instead of "if θ is large enough" in the
proposition.
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policy finally implemented) rather than using the classical Dowsian model. In
the latter model the policy offered by both parties will be simply the optimal tax
rate for the median voter’s policy. Since we believe that the behavior of parties
is not purely opportunistic, we choose to define the equilibrium policy as the
outcome of the Endogenous Party Wittman Equilibrium (EPWE) proposed by
Roemer (2001) as an extension of the Wittman equilibrium in which parties’
preferences are endogenously determined.
Notice that we have two idiosyncratic variables that characterize voters: the
income level, yi, and the error term associated to the expected value of the
aggregated level of income compliance, ǫi.For the sake of simplicity we assume
that these errors will be close enough to zero to be neglected (we know that on
average they are zero). Incorporating errors does not add any new insight but
complicates the calculus of equilibria in the political competition stage quite a
bit.
Finally, we focus on the interior equilibria, ruling out the extreme cases in
which a party offers either a zero tax rate or full taxation.
3 Political Competition
Once we have characterized voters’ preferences on tax rate we study the political
competition stage. To do that we assume that there are two parties (labeled L
and R) competing under majority rule that simultaneously announce their tax
rate policies. Voters vote for their preferred policy, and the party with the most
votes wins and implements the policy announced during the campaign.
Formally, given a pair of policy announcements tL and tR, let Ω(tL, tR) be
the set of voters who prefer tL to tR. That is:
Ω(tL, tR) = {yi ∈ (0, Y ] : v(tL; y) ≥ v(tR; y)}
Using (??) and (5), and for tL > tR, we have
Ω(tL, tR) = {yi ∈ (0, Y ] : y ≤ Ψ(tL, tR)} , (8)
where Ψ(tL, tR) = (θ− (tL+ tR)βy(1− θ)2)y represents the dividing voter, that
is, a voter that is indifferent between the Left Party and the Right Party.
Let Φ(tL, tR) be the proportion of voters voting for party L, corresponding





Parties face electoral uncertainty in the sense that they know the pool of their
supporters, but can only forecast the share of the vote they will receive with a
margin of error ∆. Formally, we follow the "error-distribution model" presented
in Roemer (2001, p.45). Let parties L and R propose tL and tR, respectively.
Then, the proportion of votes that party L expects to receive is a random
variable uniformly distributed on the interval (Φ(tL, tR)−∆, Φ(tL, tR) +∆)
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for some ∆ > 0. It follows that the probability that party L will defeat party





0 if Φ(tL, tR) +∆ ≤ 1/2
Φ(tL,tR)+∆−1/2
2∆ otherwise
1 if Φ(tL, tR)−∆ ≥ 1/2.
,
and that party R will defeat party L with probability 1− p(tL, tR).
Parties have policy preferences representing the average utility of their mem-
bers (Wittman 1973). The constituents of party L are denoted by the sets of
voters ΩL, and the constituents of party R are denoted by the sets of voters






Given a distribution of voter preferences, a political equilibrium provides:
i) a partition of the polity into two parties, labeled L and R, respectively; ii)
the platform that each party proposes; and iii) the expected vote share of each
party.
Both parties simultaneously choose the platform that maximizes their ex-
pected utility given the platform proposed by the other party. At equilibrium,
the following two conditions must be satisfied: (1) no party prefers to change
its platform given both the platform of the other party and the partition of the
polity; and (2) no party’s constituent wants to change its membership given the
two parties’ platforms.
Definition 8 An Endogenous Parties Wittman Equilibrium (EPWE)
is a pair of policies (t∗L, t
∗
R) ∈ [0, 1]




1. Given ΩLi and Ω
R
i ,
t∗L = argmax p(t, t
∗
R)V
L(t) + (1− p(t, t∗R))V
L(t∗R), and (10)
t∗R = argmax p(t
∗
L, t)V




2. Given t∗L and t
∗
R,
if y ∈ ΩLi , then vi(t
∗
L; y) ≥ vi(t
∗
R; y), and (12)
if y ∈ ΩRi , then vi(t
∗




The first-order conditions for the maximization problems (10) and (11) show
the trade-off between proposing a policy closer to the interests of each party’s























(V R(t)− V R(tL))
]
= 0
At equilibrium, the constituency of each party is determined endogenously by
expressions (12) and (13). From (8), and given the equilibrium policies t∗L > t
∗
R,
the constituency or each party is fully characterized by a level of income Ψ∗,
so that voters with income such that y < Ψ∗ constitute party L, while the rest
constitute party R.
Therefore, finding an interior equilibrium requires solving the following sys-























(V R(t)− V R(tL))
]
= 0
Ψ = Ψ(tL, tR)
4 Calibration and Numerical Results
We calibrate the model using data for countries in EU-27 for the year 2010.
To compute political equilibria we need values for y, ym, θ, β and ∆. We
assume that income distribution follows a log normal distribution with mean
and median income respectively, y = 30, 648 and ym = 26, 079 (in euros). 4
Using equation (6), the values of θ are restricted in order to have an interior
optimal tax rate for the median voter. In particular θ ≥ 0.851 to have a non
negative optimal tax rate for the median voter. This is because in order to have




θy > ymed ⇔
4Eurostat reports mean annual gross earnings but not median annual gross earnings. How-
ever, they report mean and median hourly gross earnings. We use the ratio betwen mean
and median hourly gross earnings to calculate the median anual gross earnings. The data are







To calibrate the parameters β and θ, we use equations (6) and (3). We need
data on both the optimal tax rate for the median voter, and the threshold in
income such that voters with an income higher than that start evading taxes.
According to Eurostat data, the average EU-27 personal income tax rate
for a single individual without children with 80% of average earnings in 2010
was 0.2737. Additionally, data from World Bank (see Schnaider et al., 2010)
indicate that the average size of the shadow economy for countries in EU-27 is
22.1% of total economic activity.
First, using the calibrated income distribution function, we calculate the
threshold income for tax evaders in equation (3). In particular, we find that all
voters with earnings above 40, 366 euros a year prefer not to report their whole
taxable income.
Assuming that the implemented tax rate is the optimal for the median voter,
we calibrate the parameters β and θ solving the following two equations systems:








We adjust the margin of error in forecasting the share of the vote to 3%,
i.e. ∆ = 0.03, for the baseline calculations in order to get EPWEs that are
consistent with our data.
Table 1 shows the baseline EPEWEs (in italics) and a comparative static
regarding the parameters β, θ, and∆. In particular, we show the equilibrium tax
rate proposed by the Left and Right Parties denoted by tL and tR, respectively;
the probability of winning for the Left Party denoted by ProbL; the share of the
vote cast by the Left Party denoted by %votesL; the expected implemented
tax rate denoted by E[t] where E[t] = ProbL ∗ tL+ (1−ProbL) ∗ tR; and
the share of the voters who do not report their whole taxable income denoted
by %avoidance.
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Table 1. Interior EPWEs
θ tL tR ProbL %votesL E[t] %avoidance
0.88 0.258 0.030 0.421 49.529 0.126 32.381
0.90 0.454 0.027 0.579 50.472 0.274 22.074
0.92 0.908 0.023 0.761 51.563 0.696 9.727
a. EPWE depending on θ
β tL tR ProbL %votesL E[t] %avoidance
0.15 0.825 0.033 0.591 50.543 0.501 22.028
0.27 0.454 0.027 0.579 50.472 0.274 22.074
0.40 0.311 0.021 0.573 50.438 0.187 22.092
b. EPWE depending on β
∆ tL tR ProbL %votesL E[t] %avoidance
0.05 0.568 0.027 0.421 49.529 0.126 32.381
0.03 0.454 0.027 0.579 50.472 0.274 22.074
0.02 0.394 0.027 0.725 50.899 0.293 20.927
c. EPWE depending on ∆
First, our calibrated model predicts an expected tax rate of 0.274 which
is very close to the one reported by Eurostat for the average EU-27 personal
income tax rate for a single individual without children with 80% of average
earnings in 2010. Moreover, it also predicted a share of voters who do not
report their whole taxable income of 22.074%, which is very close to the average
size of the shadow economy for countries in EU-27 reported by the World Bank
.
Second, a general view of Table 1 shows that there exists a high divergence in
parties’ policy platforms. This divergence is explained by the large polarization
of voters’ preferences on the tax rate.5 It is also interesting to note that the
Left Party always reacts more intensively than the Right Party regarding policy
platforms to changes in parameters of the model. The reason is that the Right
Party has a large fixed constituency with strict preferences on zero tax rate,
while the Left Party’s constituency has more variable preferences. 6
Panel a. in Table 1 shows that a decrease in voters’ confidence in society’s
tax morale (i.e. a decrease in θ) makes the Left Party heavily reduce their
tax rate proposed in equilibrium. However, it slightly increases the tax rate
5Polarization in voters’ preferences on tax rate is given by the specification of the assumed
voters’ utility function which is linear in consumption. A logarithmic specification may pro-
duce smoother results. However, the main insights of the paper would not change.
6Recall that in the calibrated model the median voter prefers a tax rate of 0.2737. This
tax rate is closer to the optimal one for the Right Party’s extreme constituency than for the
Left Party’s extreme constituency.
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proposed by the Right Party. As a consequence, the Left Party’s probability of
winning decreases.
As we have seen in the previous section, an increase in the pessimistic bias
in voters’ beliefs about society’s tax morale push preferences for redistribution
down, giving the Right Party an advantage to win the election. In order to not
lose many votes, the Left Party drastically reduces its proposed tax rate, thus
sacrificing the utility of its more radical members. However, the Right Party
benefits from this advantage by increasing their proposed tax rate only slightly.
Finally, the expected implemented tax rate falls and the share of tax evaders
increases.
Voters’ sensitivity towards the social cost of tax avoidance has a generalized
effect in equilibrium parties’ policy platforms. It is shown in Panel b. that
an increase in voters’ sensitivity to the social cost of tax avoidance (i.e. an
decrease in β) makes both parties propose a lower tax rate. This is because an
increase in voters’ sensitivity to tax avoidance makes every unit of tax burden
evaded more costly in terms of utility, so it discourages income taxation. As
in the case of the effect of voters’ confidence on society’s tax morale, it also
gives the Right Party an advantage to win the election. However, the extent
of the effect of voters’ sensitivity to tax avoidance is much more reduced than
the former. Consequently, an increase in voters’ sensitivity to the social cost of
tax avoidance has almost no effect on both the vote share and the level of tax
compliance.
Finally, using Panel c. we analyze the effect of parties’ accuracy to forecast
their vote share on equilibrium outcomes. As uncertainty reduces, the Left
Party converges rapidly to the optimal tax rate for the median voter while the
Right Party practically does not move its policy platform. Again the reason is
the large share of an immobile Right Party constituency with strict preferences.
This gives the Left Party an advantage to win the election so it increases the
probability that the Left Party will win. Therefore, the expected implemented
tax rate is larger and it increases the level of tax compliance.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we study how voters’ views about society’s tax morale may shape
income redistribution. We present a model in which the implemented tax rate is
the outcome of a political competition in which parties are formed endogenously
and voters may not report their whole taxable income.
The main findings are as follows. First, regarding preferences for income re-
distribution, we find that only taxpayers who are poor enough prefer a nonzero
tax rate. Consequently, they report their entire taxable income. Richer taxpay-
ers prefer no taxation and they evade in case a positive tax rate is implemented.
Secondly, regarding political competition, at equilibrium, partisan parties
propose different tax rates above and below the optimal one for the median voter.
We name the Left (Right) Party the one that proposes the highest (lowest) tax
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rate. Moreover, we find that the Right Party’s constituency has more strict
preferences than the Left Party’s constituency. This causes the Right Party to
always react less intensively than the Left Party does to changes in parameters
of the model.
Finally, we find that parties’ probability of winning in equilibrium is affected
by two factors: The degree of pessimism in voters’ concerns about society’s tax
morale, and the level of parties’ electoral uncertainty. More precisely, we find
that an increase in the pessimistic bias in voters’ conjectures about society’s
tax morale increases the Right Party’s probability of winning in equilibrium.
Hence, the expected implemented tax rate falls and the level of tax compliance
decreases. However, an increase in parties’ accuracy to forecast their vote share
increases the Left Party’s probability of winning. This increases the expected
implemented tax rate and also increases the level of tax compliance.
From these results we can expect that right parties will tend to increase the
pessimistic view of voters about society’s tax morale, while left parties will push
voters’ optimism.
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Proof of Proposition1. Let us first characterize voters preferences on x.
The first-order condition of the maximization utility maximization problem with
respect to the decided level of tax evasion is as follows:
t(θy − y) + 2β(ty)2(1− θx− ǫi)θ = 0⇔





(1 + 2βty(1− ǫi))θy − y
2βty2θ2
We know that x∗ must belong to the interval [0, 1] . This is the case when:
0 ≤
(1 + 2βty(1− ǫi))θy − y
2βty2θ2
≤ 1, and
This inequality can be reduced to the following:
(1 + 2βty(1− θ − ǫi))θy ≤ y ≤ (1 + 2βty(1− ǫi))θy (15)





1 if y ≤ (1 + 2βty(1− θ − ǫi))θy
(1+2βty(1−ǫi))θy−y
2βty2θ2
if y ∈ ((1 + 2βty(1− θ − ǫi))θy, (1 + 2βty(1− ǫi))θy)
0 if y ≥ (1 + 2βty(1− ǫi))θy
(16)
Defining the function g(z) = (1 + 2βtyz)y, we can rewrite expressions (16)









θ ∈ (g(1− θ − ǫi), g(1− ǫi))
0 if yθ ≥ g(1− ǫi)
Proof of Proposition 2. From Proposition 1 we have that voters with income









θ ∈ (g(1− θ − ǫi), g(1− ǫi))
0 if yθ ≥ g(1− ǫi)
where g(z) = (1 + 2βtyz)y. It is straightforward to see that dx
∗
dy ≤ 0 for all
voters with income y ∈ (0, Y ].
Proof of Proposition 3. Let us prove the first statement of the proposition.
The size of the population that reports their whole taxable income are those
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with an income such that y ≤ (1+2βty(1−θ−ǫi))θy. An increase in θ increases
the size of this group if and only if:
d(1 + 2βty(1− θ − ǫi))θy
dθ
> 0
Computing the derivative we have the following:
d(1 + 2βty(1− θ − ǫi))θy
dθ
= y − 2βty(2θ + ǫi − 1) > 0
y − 2βty(2θ + ǫi − 1) > 0⇔
θ + ǫi < 1 +
1
2βty
However, this is always true for any θ and ǫi because the maximum level of
E[x]is equal to one.
Let us now prove the second statement of the proposition. For individuals
with the same y, an increase in θ leaves the optimal level of tax evasion unaltered
for voters with an either high or low enough income. According to Proposition
1, x∗ depends on θ only for intermediate income levels. More precisely,
x∗ =





∈ (g(1− θ − ǫi), g(1− ǫi))
otherwise x∗ is either 1 or 0. Calculating the derivative of x∗ with respect




(1 + 2βty(1− ǫi))2βty












< 0 for all x∗ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Proposition 4. According to Proposition 1, x∗ is constant for
voters with low and high income levels. However, it is a function of t among
other variables for voters with intermediate income levels. This function is given
by the following identity:
x∗ =
(1 + 2βty(1− ǫi))θy − y
2βty2θ2






This is because voters with x∗(t) are all such that their pre-tax income is
larger than θy.
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Proof of Proposition 5. Using (5), it is straightforward to check that for
voters with income such that yi ≥ θg(1 − ǫi), the optimal tax rate is equal to
zero. However, for voters with income such that yi ∈ (θg(1− θ− ǫi), θg(1− ǫi)),
it is not so straightforward to prove the same.
Substituting the optimal level of tax compliance x∗i into (5), we have the
following expression for the indirect utility function for voters with yi ∈ (θg(1−
θ − ǫi), θg(1− ǫi)):




(2θ + 1)yi −
(θy − y)
βty
+ θ(y(3− 2ǫi) + 2ǫi)
]
t⇔






[(2θ + 1)yi + θ(y(3− 2ǫi) + 2ǫi)] t
And then dvi(t)dt < 0,so the optimal tax rate is zero for these voters.
Proof of Proposition 6. By (5) and (7) there are voters with an optimal
tax rate t∗i ∈ (0, 1) if and only if:
(1 + 2βt∗i y(1− θ − ǫi))θy > (θ + ǫi − 2βy(1− θ − ǫi)
2)y
Notice that voters with an optimal tax rate t∗i ∈ (0, 1) are such that x
e
i =
θ + ǫi. Then we can rewrite the inequality above as follows:
θ >









































Therefore, if θ is such that:




















such that t∗i ∈ (0, 1).
Again, using (7), it is straightforward that voters’ optimal tax rate is given
by the following expression:




1 if yi ≤ (x
e









)2y2 if yi ∈ (x
e




0 yi ≥ yH
,
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Proof of Proposition 7. By equations (5) and (7), t∗i is constant for voters
with a low and high income levels. However it is a function of θ among other
variables for voters with intermediate income levels. This function is given by
equation (6):
t∗i =
(θ + ǫi)y − yi
2β(1− θ − ǫi)2y
2




2β(1− θ − ǫi)
2y3 + 4β(1− θ − ǫi)y
2((θ + ǫi)y − yi)
(2β(1− θ − ǫi)2y
2)2
> 0
This is because voters with t∗i are all such that their pre-tax income yi is
smaller than (θ + ǫi)y.
23
